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Arms exports have increasingly become an attractive option for reducing escalating unit costs of new
weapon systems to the United States Department of Defense. However, while there is no lack of con-
jecture, there is little data that show weapon system costs to the United States actually decrease when
the same weapon is sold to a foreign buyer. The authors use the sale of the F-16 multi-role fighter
aircraft to foreign nations as a case study to quantify the financial gains realized through learning
and economies of scale attributed to export production. Using a rate-adjustment cost improvement
analysis, the authors’ case study shows the unit costs the United States Department of Defense would
have incurred without the concurrent export production of F-16s. Estimates suggest that the pro-
duction savings resulting from export production were in excess of the research, development, test,
and evaluation costs of the F-16 for the period 1975 to 1991. The potential benefits associated with
keeping the F-16 production line “warm” through export production and the limits of applying the
findings to other weapon systems are discussed.
Introduction
Arms exports have been a critical lever of U.S. foreign policy for the past 60 years and
remain so today (Bajusz & Louscher, 1988; Agmon et al. 1996; DISAM, 2010). Arms
trade scholars argue that exports have numerous financial benefits including reducing per-
unit procurement costs and preserving production lines (Bajusz & Louscher, 1988; Sandler
& Hartley 1995; Agmon et al. 1996). However, there is a lack of research that actually
shows weapon system unit costs to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have actually
been lowered as a result of increased sales to foreign buyers.
As the costs of new weapon systems escalate, arms exports have become increasingly
attractive as an option for reducing the unit cost of a system to DoD. Consideration of
financial factors arising from proposed arms transfers is an important aspect of U.S. foreign
and domestic industrial policy. In this work, we identify three sources of potential savings
associated with export production: reducing fixed and nonrecurring per-unit costs, reducing
costs through achieving economies of scale and learning, and preserving production lines.
We use the sale of the F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft program as a case study to quantify
the financial gains realized through learning and economies of scale attributed to export
production. Using a rate-adjustment cost improvement analysis, our case study shows the
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per-unit costs that DoD would have incurred without the concurrent export production of F-
16s. We discuss potential benefits associated with keeping the F-16 production line “warm”
through export production that could accrue to the U.S. Finally, we offer some remarks on
the significance of the cost improvement analysis and discuss the limits of applying our
findings to other weapon systems.
Affordability is a top priority in the acquisition of any weapon system. A popular
conjecture is that U.S. arms exports financially benefit DoD, the U.S. defense industrial
base, and the nation as a whole. Arms-trade scholars argue that arms exports theoretically
provide financial benefits to DoD by (1) reducing nonrecurring and fixed per-unit costs,
such as those for production and research and development (R&D), (2) reducing per-unit
costs through achieving economies of scale and learning, and (3) preserving production
lines (Bajusz & Louscher, 1988; Sandler & Hartley, 1995; Agmon et al., 1996).
Reducing Unit Costs by Allocating Nonrecurring Fixed Costs to Greater
Volume
A larger production volume enables total fixed costs to be spread over a larger allocation
base; therefore, the fixed cost per unit component of total unit cost should decrease as
production increases. However, the U.S. experiences a reduction in such costs (to include
R&D and production) if, and only if, a portion of these nonrecurring costs are allocated to
the customer-nation. If DoD incurs the fixed R&D cost, applies it only to domestic orders,
and waives the R&D cost for export orders, then DoD is essentially subsidizing foreign
weapon sales rather than realizing the full economic benefit. The Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) Section 21(e)(2)(A) [22 USC Sec. 2761] stipulates that the DoD must charge the
customer-nation its proportional share of the nonrecurring costs in the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) deal. However, nonrecurring costs for particular sales to NATO and other
eligible countries may be waived if the sale significantly advances U.S. interests (DISAM,
2010). Note that the nonrecurring cost waiver only applies to FMS cases administrated
by DoD. Direct sales by the contractor are not required to charge the customer-nation its
proportional share of recurring cost. DoD’s waiving or failing to recoup these costs enables
the defense contractor to remain competitive on price.
By waiving nonrecurring costs and not charging customer-nations their proportional
share of such costs, direct sales greatly benefit the profit-maximizing defense contractor.
The defense contractor can then export the military goods at a price determined by the
average variable costs to produce the weapon system and thereby increase its competitive-
ness in the global arms market. In other words, placing the nonrecurring cost burden on
DoD amounts to the U.S. taxpayers subsidizing foreign arms sales.
In 1998, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that DoD had not
recovered $183 million in nonrecurring costs from delivered sales—some of which dated
back to 1989 (GAO, 1998). Though the GAO admonished DoD for poor financial manage-
ment practices, this example highlights the fact that bureaucratic inconsistencies and a lack
of coordination can result in not only the failure of the U.S. public to realize cost savings
through arms exports, but also in the public subsidization of foreign arms transfers.
Reducing Unit Costs through Economies of Scale and Learning
A second source of cost savings is in the scale of production. Large production runs can
lower costs through economies of scale and learning. “Economies of scale” refers to the
relationship between a firm’s cost and output. A firm enjoys economies of scale when it
doubles its output for less than twice the cost, where marginal cost is less than average
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FIGURE 1 Long run average cost curve (from Waterson, 2010).
cost (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998). Theoretically, DoD benefits from economies of scale if
it can augment the lower levels of weapon system production for domestic consumption
with foreign orders. Assuming that augmenting domestic production with foreign orders
occurs while the defense contractor experiences increasing returns to scale, increasing pro-
duction will result in a lower per-unit cost than without foreign orders. Further, not all cost
reductions are the same. As illustrated in Figure 1, movement along the long run average
cost curve in the downward, negative-sloped region reveals that marginal cost reductions
decrease at a slower rate until reaching constant returns to scale where increases in total
cost are proportional to output.
This equates to additive foreign orders theoretically having a greater impact in reducing
per-unit cost early when the level of production is low. However, augmenting domestic
production with foreign orders will not always provide a lower per-unit cost; if the additive
foreign orders occur during diminishing returns to scale, the addition of foreign orders
would actually provide a higher per-unit cost.
Similar to economies of scale, learning may reduce per-unit costs. Learning curve
theory introduces an estimate of the incremental per-unit cost reduction in the production
process as the number of units produced increases from zero. It follows that if learning
occurs in the production process, each time the volume of production doubles, the per-unit
cost decreases at a predictable rate (FAA, 1999). Put differently, the cost of the doubled
unit equals the cost of the un-doubled unit multiplied by the slope of the learning curve
(Nussbaum, 2010). Therefore, the equation defining the learning curve is exponential and
negatively sloped. Figure 2 illustrates a general learning curve model that is consistent with
the early observations of aircraft production by Wright (1936) and is discussed very clearly
by Argote and Epple (1990) and Nussbaum (2010) showing unit costs decreasing as the
quantity produced increases. The shape of the learning curve makes it evident that more
learning and consequently greater per-unit cost reductions occur early in the production
process.
Both economies of scale and learning curve theory posit per-unit cost reductions.
However, the basis for economies of scale is the scale of production, while learning curve
cost reductions rely on cumulative production. Therefore, arms exports theoretically pro-
vide the largest cost reductions if they are incorporated at the beginning of production.
Conversely, dedicating units of production for export toward the end of U.S. procure-
ment will have a significantly lesser effect on cost reduction. Making the case for arms
exports, unit cost savings depends greatly on both the scale of production and learning




FIGURE 2 General learning curve model.
TABLE 1 Estimated savings through minimum to optimal production for
selected weapon systems (from Hartley, 2006)






already achieved. Empirical research has shown that it is difficult to differentiate cost sav-
ings between economies of scale and learning (Hartley, 2007). However, Hartley (2006)
found that median, per-unit cost savings were 10 to 20% as a result of increasing the scale
of production from minimum efficiency to what might be called ideal or efficient condi-
tions. Table 1 shows the cost savings associated with different weapon systems as the scale
of production moves toward most efficient conditions (Hartley, 2006).
Further, Sandler and Hartley (1995) suggest that the production and learning curves
associated with aircraft production range from 75 to 80%. The production and learning
curves associated with other weapon system production, to include aircraft engines, avion-
ics, electronics, missiles, main battle tanks, and warships, range from 70 to 96% (Sandler
and Hartley, 1995). While labor learning is important, Hartley (2007) points out that cost
reductions associated with learning have been affected by technology and process improve-
ments, such as new materials, computer-aided design, computer-aided manufacturing, lean,
six sigma and supply chain management.
Cost Analysis of the F-16 Multi-Role Fighter
It is difficult to accurately isolate the financial benefits enjoyed by the U.S. from foreign
arms production. Theoretically, per-unit cost reductions occur through increases in produc-
tion volume due to economies of scale and gains in efficiency through learning. Foreign
arms sales present an opportunity to increase production volume and allocate nonrecurring
and fixed costs to non-U.S. customers. The Lockheed Martin (formerly General Dynamics)
F-16 fighter aircraft is one of the most prolific arms exports to date, flying under 21 sepa-
rate flagged air forces and is also the most produced fourth-generation western fighter, with
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the Cold War era, the merits of using the F-16 as a case study for analysis lie in the fact that
the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program involved the European Participating Governments
(EPG) of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway in the early development and
later in the co-production of the aircraft. This multinational effort resembles the F-35 joint
strike fighter program in that several allied nations entered into an agreement to purchase a
common aircraft that could be purchased affordably due to the large numbers of orders. The
F-16 program began in 1975, with the U.S. receiving its first five aircraft in 1978; within a
decade, close to 2,200 aircraft had been delivered, with foreign customers accounting for
35% of the total deliveries.
Beginning in 1981, a host of other nations entered into agreements with the U.S. to
purchase the F-16 aircraft for their own air forces. As of 2010, 50.1% of all F-16 deliveries
were to foreign customers. Of those foreign deliveries, 22.8% were to the EPG (Janes
Information Group, 2010). The F-16 production for this analysis can be partitioned into
two model generations, the A/B and the C/D. The A and the C models are single-seat
aircraft, while the B and D are double-seat variants primarily used for training. This case
study will focus on cost reductions that result through larger production quantities as a
result of increasing the market of the weapon system through foreign sales.
Methodology
Although the F-16 is one of the most prevalent fighter aircraft programs in modern his-
tory, there is a lack of detailed foreign sales and unit production cost data. DoD’s Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR) provide annual data on U.S. procurement cost, U.S. procure-
ment quantity, foreign procurement quantity, and U.S. aircraft delivery. The SARs do not
contain data regarding foreign deliveries. Foreign delivery data were obtained through F-
16 archivist Björn Claes (2010), who compiled a database of F-16 delivery schedules and
quantities from Foreign Military Sales documents, official Lockheed Martin datasets, and
contacts from within foreign air forces.
The SARs provide production and delivery data, covering the years 1975 through 1994.
By the end of 1994, the F-16 program reached 90% of its expected production delivery
and SAR reporting concluded. In fact, after 1991, U.S. deliveries significantly tapered off,
thereby making that year a reasonable upper bound for the analysis. To identify cost reduc-
tions with cost improvement analysis, production for the U.S. and foreign customer-nations
must be concurrent. Cost and quantity data from 1984 coincide with deliveries of C/D mod-
els and the preponderance of foreign sales (excluding EPG). For these reasons and others
discussed in the following section, the scope of this case study focuses on F-16 deliveries
between 1984 and 1991.
Using cost improvement analysis, this case study takes a counterfactual approach to
estimate per-unit cost if export production did not occur. Two main types of cost improve-
ment analysis exist: ordinary cost improvement curves (CIC) and a rate-adjustment cost
improvement curve (RACIC) model that includes a rate term. Ordinary CICs are synony-
mous with learning curves and postulate that in production involving repetitive tasks, the
per-unit variable costs will decrease by a certain factor with each doubling of cumulative
production. Moses (1990) notes that production rates can lead to greater specialization
of labor, quantity discounts in raw material purchases, and greater utilization of facilities
thereby increasing the production quantity against which fixed overhead costs are allocated.
Bemis (1981), Boger, Greer, and Liao (1990), Large, Hoffmayer, and Kontrovich (1974),
and Linder and Wilbourn (1973) suggest that together these effects can increase efficiency
and reduce production cost. However, Moses (1990) argues that increasing the production
rate does not always reduce costs. In fact, increased production rates can actually increase
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per-unit costs due to factors, such as over-time pay, lack of skilled labor, or additional fixed
chunk investments, to increase capacity, such as constructing more production facilities.
Production rates may therefore lead to either economies or diseconomies of scale.
Moses (1991) found that ordinary CICs engendered bias due to the existence of fixed
costs in total cost and tended to understate the actual costs. While the rate-adjustment CIC
(RACIC) eliminates bias, there is a tradeoff between bias and accuracy. Moses (1991) notes
that in some cases ordinary CICs can be more accurate but the high fixed costs associated
with F-16 production warrants the use of the rate-adjustment model. The equations for the
CIC and RACIC are expressed by Equations (1) and (2), respectively:
Ordinary CIC: C = aQb, (1)
where
C = Unit cost of a F-16 at quantity Q;
Q = Cumulative quantity of F-16 production;
a = Theoretical first unit cost; and
b = Cost improvement curve exponent.
Rate-adjustment CIC: CR = aQbRc, (2)
where
CR = Unit cost of a F-16 at quantity Q and production per period R;
Q = Cumulative quantity of F-16 production;
R = Annual F-16 production rate;
a = Theoretical first unit cost;
b = Cost improvement curve exponent; and
c = Production rate exponent.
Given that the unit cost is a function of cumulative production volume and rate, a
large production volume will theoretically decrease the unit cost. We define cumulative
production as the sum of production for U.S. and foreign customer-nations. By considering
the unit cost as a function of total cumulative production, we may estimate the unit cost
had the U.S. decided not to produce F-16 fighters for export.
Given the lack of detailed data, assumptions were made regarding the nature of pro-
duction and delivery. A fundamental tenet of cost improvement analysis is that the units
produced are homogeneous. By the end of 1984, 99.2% of the F-16 A/B models were
delivered into the U.S. Air Force inventory. Save the remaining six undelivered A/B mod-
els, the follow-on F-16 deliveries to the U.S. were all C/D models. The main differences
between the A/B and C/D include improved cockpit avionics and radar. These distinguish-
ing qualities imply heterogeneity and the existence of different cost curves. Within each
model generation, additional variation exists between block numbers that denote upgrades.
However, the data to which we had access do not permit disaggregation, so block variation
is held constant in the model. As illustrated in Figure 3, a delivery usually occurred two
years after procurement. This two-year lag is also assumed to remain constant through the
period analyzed.
Further, deliveries were assumed to follow the same pattern as procurement; that is,
a delivery lot of size 150 succeeds a procurement lot of size 150. Figure 4 shows actual
cost overlaid on U.S. delivery quantity. The figure shows that peaks and troughs in average
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FIGURE 4 U.S. F-16 average unit cost vs. U.S. F-16 delivery quantity.
unit cost occur about two years before increases and decreases in delivery, respectively.
Therefore, the analysis will attach cost reductions to the year of delivery. A second tenet
of cost improvement analysis is the reduction in unit cost. The SARs publish procure-
ment annual cost and quantity that permits a unit cost for the U.S. to be calculated for
each production year, which in effect becomes an annual average unit cost (AUC). This
analysis draws the annual cost from costs published under the Aircraft Procurement, Air
Force appropriation, since these costs directly pertain to the variable costs of production.
This analysis assumes a fair playing field in which the price the U.S. government pays on
average in any one year is indicative of what all purchasers paid in the same year if they
had bought the same equipment with the same profile. Therefore, the model will use the
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annual U.S. AUC as the unit cost for all annual production. After 1991, the U.S. tapered off
its deliveries. Consequently, the high fixed costs and reduced production base contributed
to the increase in AUC after 1991. Due to this cost structure, post-1991 delivery data is
omitted from the analysis.
Application of the Ordinary and Rate-Adjustment Cost Improvement Curves
The cost improvement curve analysis utilizes the equations introduced in the aforemen-
tioned methodology section. Table 2 contains actual F-16 cost and quantity data and can be
used to replicate this analysis. To construct the ordinary CIC, the theoretical first unit cost
term, a, and the cost improvement curve exponent, b, must first be solved by employing the
linear regression technique to the log transformation of the lot midpoint (LMP), LN(LMP)
or x1, and the log transformation of the average unit cost from two years prior, LN(AUC-
2yrs) or y. To compute the lot midpoint for each year, the cumulative U.S. delivery and
cumulative foreign delivery data must be aggregated in order to determine the total annual
cumulative deliveries.
Since we do not know the actual slope of the learning curve, we calculate the LMP
associated with each year using a parameter–free approximation method from Nussbaum
(1994). We calculate the LMP using the total cumulative deliveries such that:





where F is the first unit number in a lot which is the previous year’s cumulative produc-
tion plus one unit and L is the last unit number in a lot. Nussbaum (1994) points out that
Equation (3) is not a good estimator for the first lot so a “rule-of-thumb” is used to estimate
the lot midpoint, RLMP, for lot 1 such that:
RLMP =
{
L/2 if L < 10;
L/3 otherwise.
(4)
With the independent and dependent variables identified, the regression can then be calcu-
lated for the range 1984 through 1991. The regression yields coefficients for the intercept
and independent variable (x1). The intercept coefficient is the logarithm of a. Therefore,
to get the theoretical first unit cost term, the antilogarithm of a is applied by raising the
constant e (base of the natural logarithm) to the power of a, so the expression becomes
ea or approximately 2.71828a. The x1 coefficient simply becomes b. Similarly, the rate-
adjustment CIC requires the addition of the log transformed total delivery independent
variable, LN(Delivery) x2, into the regression model. The x2 coefficient from the regression
output becomes the production rate exponent or c. With the CIC terms solved, the ordinary
and rate-adjustment CICs can now be constructed. Using the assumptions stated earlier, the
cost improvement curves are expressed by Equations (5) and (6):
Ordinary CIC: C = 567.9886Q−0.4027, (5)
Rate-adjustment CIC: CR = 721.5729Q−0.3618R−0.1009. (6)
The ordinary cost improvement curve model expresses the relationship between per-unit
F-16 cost and cumulative production whereas the rate-adjustment cost improvement curve
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model expresses the relationship between per-unit F-16 cost, cumulative production, and
production rate.
Both cost improvement models enable the estimation of F-16 AUC, had the U.S.
decided not to produce the aircraft for export between 1984 and 1991, by using the recon-
structed LMP for the U.S. as the quantity term and annual U.S. delivery for the rate term
in the rate-adjustment model. Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the estimated aver-
age annual per-unit cost savings. The actual AUC at delivery in Table 3 is based on the
actual AUC at procurement lagged by two years from Table 2. Comparing the calculated
cost savings (or costs avoided) using the estimated average unit costs for ordinary and rate
adjustment CICs, the rate-adjustment CIC estimates savings in excess of 12% higher than
the ordinary CIC, with savings estimated at an average of 20 and 23%, respectively, from
1984 to 1991.
A second method of estimating cost savings is through the use of annual lot costs using
the derived Equations (5) and (6). As discussed earlier, this analysis relies on attaching the
procurement average unit cost to delivery lots. First, the lot costs need to be reconstructed
using U.S.-only delivery quantities to determine notional costs incurred for the scenario
where the U.S. does not incorporate export production. Second, the lot costs need to be
reconstructed based on the U.S. delivery lot quantities and where these lots occurred with
respect to total cumulative production (U.S. and foreign). In order to make these estimates,
a critical assumption is made: within each production lot (year), all U.S. deliveries are pro-
duced first and foreign deliveries second. Without this assumption, it becomes increasingly
difficult to make these types of estimates. Further, it seems logical that the U.S. would want
to take delivery of its fighters before satisfying the needs of foreign buyers. The ramifica-
tions of this assumption are obvious in that any estimated savings will be minimized since
U.S. deliveries within each lot will be more costly per unit than the foreign deliveries within
the same lot because they were all produced earlier. Thus, all estimated savings are very
conservative, given our assumption that the U.S. takes its deliveries first.
The cost of a specific lot using the ordinary cost improvement curve (CIC) is












which may be approximated by
CICF,L ∼=
aLb+1
b + 1 −
a(F − 1)b+1
b + 1 . (8)












which may be approximated by
RACICF,L ∼=
aLb+1Rc
b + 1 −
a(F − 1)b+1Rc
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FIGURE 6 F-16 estimated per-unit cost savings.
The values of a, b, and c are expressed in Equations (5) and (6).
Using Equation (8), we may use the ordinary CIC to estimate the lot cost in the year
1984 that is associated without export production, so that
CICF,L ∼=
567.9886 · 796−0.4027+1
−0.4027 + 1 −
567.9886 · 673−0.4027+1
−0.4027 + 1 = $4, 902.2698,
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1984 $4,902.2698 $4,063.2563 $839.0135 17%
1985 $4,677.8849 $3,880.4459 $797.4390 17%
1986 $5,356.0763 $4,494.3644 $861.7119 16%
1987 $5,768.4893 $4,865.5042 $902.9851 16%
1988 $5,574.1557 $4,694.8413 $879.3144 16%
1989 $4,716.6312 $3,977.2396 $739.3916 16%
1990 $5,706.5033 $4,825.5873 $880.9160 15%
1991 $3,868.9873 $3,268.7841 $600.2032 16%
Totals (CY09$M) $40,570.9978 $34,070.0231 $6,500.9747
∗Reconstructed lot costs for U.S. aircraft if no export production occurred.
Estimates assume all U.S.-delivered aircraft produced first in each lot (year).
where 796 (or L) is the last U.S. unit delivered in the year 1984, which is the cumulative
U.S. delivery of F-16s in the year 1983 plus the production rate of 123 in the year 1984, and
673 is the cumulative U.S. delivery of F-16s in the year 1983 (see Table 2). The estimated
lot cost without export production is $4,902.2698M, which corresponds with the first row
in Table 4. Using Equation (8) we may use the ordinary CIC to estimate the lot cost in the
year 1984 that is associated with export production, so that
CICF,L ∼=
567.9886 · 1,231−0.4027+1
−0.4027 + 1 −
567.9886 · 1,108−0.4027+1
−0.4027 + 1 = $4,063.2563,
where 1,231 (or L) is the last U.S. unit delivered in the year 1984, which is the cumulative
delivery of F-16s in the year 1983 (both U.S. and foreign deliveries) plus the production
rate of 123 in the year 1984, and 1,108 (or F-1) is the cumulative delivery of F-16s in the
year 1983 (see Table 2). The estimated lot cost with export production is $4,063.2563M,
which corresponds with the first row in Table 4.
Using Equation 10 we may use the rate-adjustment CIC to estimate the lost cost in
1984 that is associated without export production, so that
RACICF,L ∼=
721.5729 · 796−0.3618+1 · 123−0.1009
−0.3618 + 1
− 721.5729 · 673
−0.3618+1 · 123−0.1009
−0.3618 + 1 = $5,019.3643,
where 796 (or L) is the last U.S. unit delivered in the year 1984, which is the cumulative
U.S. delivery of F-16s in the year 1983 plus the production rate of 123 in the year 1984. The
production rate, R, for the year 1984 is 123, and 673(or F-1) is the cumulative U.S. delivery
of F-16s in the year 1983 (see Table 2). The estimated lot cost without export production
is $5,019.3643M, which corresponds with the first row in Table 5. Using Equation (10) we
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TABLE 5 Estimated F-16 export production U.S. lot cost savings using the rate-














1984 $5, 019.3643 $4, 240.4323 $778.9320 16%
1985 $4, 812.5376 $4, 068.6793 $743.8583 15%
1986 $5, 435.7007 $4, 643.2035 $792.4972 15%
1987 $5, 810.8297 $4, 986.7368 $824.0929 14%
1988 $5, 634.7490 $4, 829.3824 $805.3666 14%
1989 $4, 849.1211 $4, 160.4031 $688.7180 14%
1990 $5, 755.2622 $4, 950.4340 $804.8282 14%
1991 $4, 058.2147 $3, 487.8715 $570.3432 14%
Totals (CY09$M) $41, 375.7793 $35, 367.1429 $6, 008.6364
∗Reconstructed lot costs for U.S. aircraft if no export production occurred.
Estimates assume all U.S.-delivered aircraft produced first in each lot (year).
may use the rate-adjustment CIC to estimate the lot cost in the year 1984 that is associated
with export production, so that
RACICF,L ∼=
721.5729 · 1,231−0.3618+1 · 123−0.1009
−0.3618 + 1
− 721.5729 · 1,108
−0.3618+1 · 123−0.1009
−0.3618 + 1 = $4,240.4323,
where 1,231 (or L) is the last unit produced in the year 1984, which is the cumulative
delivery of F-16s in the year 1983 plus the production rate of 123 in the year 1984. The
production rate, R, for the year 1984 is 123, and 1,108 (or F-1) is the cumulative delivery
of F-16s in the year 1983 (see Table 2). The estimated lot cost with export production is
$4,063.2563M, which corresponds with the first row in Table 5.
Table 4 displays the estimated U.S. lot cost savings using the ordinary cost improve-
ment curve model. Table 5 displays the estimated U.S. lot cost savings using the
rate-adjustment cost improvement curve model. The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that
for the years 1984–1991, the cost savings due to export production are (in CY09$) $6.5B
(16.0%) and $6.0B (14.5%), based on the ordinary and rate-adjustment CICs, respectively.
Figures 7 and 8 display the estimated U.S. lot cost savings using both the ordinary and
rate-adjustment cost improvement curve models. Since the ordinary CIC does not control
for production rate, the savings are slightly more robust.
Both attempts at estimating cost savings take different approaches. The first cost sav-
ings method using AUC is potentially less refined because it does not incorporate the effects
of learning within that production lot. Further, the AUC method aggregates both U.S. and
foreign deliveries and makes no assumption as to when U.S. and foreign-bound production
occurred within the lot. Finally, this method relies on comparing the calculated AUC to the
actual AUC based on procurement costs and quantity. This method most closely compares
estimated costs with actual costs. The second method utilizes lot costs to estimate savings
assuming the U.S. decided not to export F-16s to foreign customers. All costs utilizing this
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FIGURE 8 Estimated U.S. F-16 lot cost savings.
second method are reconstructed. Further, the assumption regarding the production of U.S.
deliveries prior to foreign deliveries within each lot results in conservative estimated cost
savings to the United States.
As with any analysis, results are only as valid as the underlying assumptions. We have
assumed that the U.S. would have followed the same production rate had there been no
sales to foreign countries. Unfortunately, there are no data available to determine whether
or not this assumption is sound or whether the U.S. would have produced aircraft at a
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different rate in the absence of foreign sales. Given the fixed costs and potential excess
capacity, the U.S. may have decided to speed up the procurement schedule, and thus con-
clude production earlier. Regardless of the model used, we estimate that the U.S. saved at
least $6 billion by incorporating export production over the year period between 1984 and
1991. Further, according to the selected acquisition reports (SARs), from 1975 to 1991,
the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs for the F-16 were approxi-
mately $3.5 billion in current year 2009 dollars, which suggests that the estimated savings
accrued as a result of export production more than covered the development costs of the
aircraft.
Preservation of Production Lines as a Measure to Reduce Life Cycle
Costs of Weapons
Generally, the decision to keep a production line open is a balance between cost and sched-
ule (or response time). An open production line serves as an insurance policy of sorts in
that it provides the U.S. with quick, cost-effective surge capacity in times of war, and the
open production line prevents the cessation of production capabilities and the erosion of
employee skill sets that are needed for production in the near term. Reconstituting a stag-
nant production line can incur high restart costs in addition to significant increases in lead
times (Gold, 1999).
Gaps in production lines occur due to misalignment of U.S. weapon system pro-
curement or conversion. There are three options to address gaps in production. First, a
production line could go “cold,” whereby it will be reconstituted later. Birkler, Large,
Smith, and Timson (1993) suggest that reconstituting a cold production line can some-
times be the most cost-effective solution, since restarted programs take less time from
program start to first delivery and are less expensive and risky than the original program.
However, when reconstituting a cold production line is deemed more costly, other options
exist. An alternative to letting a production grow “cold” is to keep it “warm” through sus-
tained low-rate production. This is often the desired option when the system is a critical
national asset with one supplier and no commercial market because if production ceases,
the supplier might go out of business (Birkler et al., 1993). While keeping the production
line “warm” might be a lower cost alternative, the costs may still be extraordinarily high
due to the fact that the existing fixed-cost structures were designed for high-rate production.
The third option is maintaining high-rate production and storing any excess or unneeded
equipment for later use or contingencies. In this case, it could also mean selling the excess
to foreign buyers. Regardless of the option, significant costs are associated with maintain-
ing production capacity in reserve for the future. However, these costs can be reduced if
the capacity is allocated for export production because the U.S. will incur neither produc-
tion costs when there is no actual demand nor the holding costs associated with keeping
non-operational systems in the inventory.
Agmon et al. (1996) identified export production as a cost-saving solution to preserv-
ing production lines during gaps in U.S. production noting that a period of two to three
years elapsed between the end and resumption of production for both the M1 main bat-
tle tank and AH-64 attack helicopter programs. During these periods, only export units
remained in production. In the case of the M1 production ending in 1993, maintaining
the production base and employment levels through export enabled a one-third cost reduc-
tion for the U.S. M1 tank conversion program that commenced in 1995 (OUSD A&T,
1994). Similarly, export production of the AH-64 kept the production line “warm” after
U.S. production ended in 1993 and recommenced in 1996 with production of the upgraded
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AH-64D (OUSD A&T, 1994). Overall, export production provides a convenient lever for
maintaining production lines, and more broadly, industrial base “warmth.”
The U.S. F-16 program reached its 90% completion in 1994. After 1994, delivery
quantity dropped to a squadron (24 aircraft) or less per year. In fact, the F-16 delivery quan-
tities to DoD dropped to single digits from 1997–2002. The last originally programmed
U.S. F-16 delivery was for 1999, yet production continued at Lockheed’s Fort Worth plant.
Between 1995 and 2007, U.S. F-16 deliveries constituted roughly 10% of U.S. production
and 7% of all F-16s produced worldwide (Claes, 2010; Aerospace Industries Association,
n.d.). Further, the U.S. produced an average of 55 aircraft annually between 1995 and
2007 with F-16 production occurring in overseas plants averaging 21 aircraft per year dur-
ing this same period (Claes, 2010). From an operations and maintenance standpoint, DoD
stands to benefit from a “warm” F-16 production line with the availability and reduced
cost of spare parts. Clearly, by continuing lower rate production beyond the U.S. planned
requirement, this “warm” production line retained valuable skill sets. Whether those skill
sets can be applied to the production of future, fifth-generation fighter aircraft, such as the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, is a topic that warrants future research.
Even after the U.S. ceased procurement of the F-16, Lockheed Martin continued
to develop the F-16 for its foreign customers. The F-16 E/Fs delivered to the United
Arab Emirates in mid-2005 are considered “half of a generation” ahead of the U.S. F-
16 inventory (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). These F-16s are equipped with the Northrop
Grumman AN/APG-80 AESA radar that allows an aircraft to simultaneously perform
air-to-air search-and-track, air-to-ground targeting, and aircraft terrain-following, making
the UAE the first foreign military (other than the U.S. Air Force) to possess this revo-
lutionary technology. Indeed, the avionics and electronics of the F-16 have dramatically
progressed. In fact, the current F-16s produced for export have a core computer suite that
has 2,000 times as much memory and over 260 times as much throughput as the orig-
inal F-16s (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). Undoubtedly, the F-16s currently rolling off
the Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant are much more capable than the USAF’s own
F-16 inventory. Should future fifth-generation combat aircraft, such as the F-35, become
too costly, the new production F-16s may be a cost effective solution to supplement the
U.S.’s air forces. This solution would be financially beneficial to DoD since export pro-
duction kept the F-16 line and DoD would not incur the substantial costs of restarting
a production line. Further, the evolution of the F-16 was supported through export pro-
duction. If DoD did decide to procure new late-model F-16s, the costs associated with
technology upgrades would have been subsidized through foreign sales, reducing DoD’s
aircraft upgrade cost burden. In sum, the F-16 production line kept “warm” and evolving
through foreign demand provides a potentially cost-effective solution for supplementing
U.S. combat aircraft inventory.
Conclusions
Brzoska (2004) points out that, despite numerous analyses, books, and research articles
on the global arms trade, very little is known about the financial aspects of arms exports.
Further, conjecture acknowledging savings through arms exports is commonplace, though
the magnitude of savings is rarely, if ever, quantified. This research suggests that such
conjectured savings do exist and are potentially substantial. From a financial standpoint,
decision-makers must be wary in assuming that export production is universally beneficial
to DoD. As discussed, if additive export production enables total production to achieve
economies of scale, certainly export production is easier to justify in financial terms.
Conversely, if the additive export production necessitates substantial overtime labor charges
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or significant investments for chunk capacity, the export production may actually create
diseconomies of scale.
However, as indicated in the conventional arms transfer (CAT) policy, financial fac-
tors are one aspect that must be considered in any proposed arms transfer. Therefore, the
quantification of financial benefits realized through export must be weighed against any
potentially negative security externalities. While this research does not attempt to explicate
the tradeoff between financial benefits and negative security implications arising from the
transfer of arms, this research does provide an understanding of the financial gains through
export production and insight into comprehending the holistic financial gains associated
with such proposed arms transfers.
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